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THE MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF CREDIT RISK
A discussion, at the outset, of the conceptual
aspects of credit risk and credit quality is neces-
sary for a general orientation and will provide a basis
for the selection of the relevant time series, and
will serve as useful background information for
their interpretation. In this chapter, we review the
more important considerations that the researcher
or analyst should have in mind when reaching a
judgment about the risk status of the nation's
credit structure.
Quality, Risk and Collection Difficulties
Most analysts, when they consider the rewards and
hazards of credit, tend to speak and write about
them in terms of the quality of credit. Unfortu-
nately, the term "credit quality" is often a con-
fusing one; It tends to mean different things to
different people. The different meanings, however,
have a common element, a common denominator
—theyall relate to the risk of credit difficulties.'
Whatever "quality" may mean to any of us, our
ultimate concern in this volume is with the prob-
lem of credit risk and credit collection difficulties
and the impact that they may have on the eco-
nomic and financial health of the nation. Thus, it
is to credit risk —theprobability that a loan will
not be repaid according to the terms of the con-
tract —ratherthan the less well defined idea of
"credit quality," to which we turn our attention.
Retrospective vs. Prospective Credit Risk
We have been talking, thus far, about credit risk
and credit collection difficulties as though they
represented essentially the same thing. In a sense
that is true, but there is an important distinction
between them —thedistinction between the past
and the future. Credit collection difficulties refer
to defaults, failures, etc., that have been experi-
enced; that is, to actual collection difficulties re-
corded after the fact. The term "credit risk," on
the other hand, is a forward-looking concept, fo-
cusing on the probable incidence of credit difficul-
ties in the future.
The importance of distinguishing between re-
trospective and prospective credit risk is most ob-
vious when we start to measure credit risk. Retro-
spective measures of collection difficulties, such as
delinquencies and losses, are perhaps the most
clear and straightforward indicators we have in this
area, especially for historical research. For eco-
nomic and financial policy- or decision-making
purposes, however, measuring risk by actual credit
experience is not sufficient. What is needed for
these purposes are measures that indicate not only
how prevalent collection difficulties have been in
the past, even the immediate past, but also how
prevalent they are likely to be in the future. We
want to know what may be expected in the way of
failures, losses, etc., in the coming months.
Measuring Prospective Risk
How, then, can credit risk be measured pro-
spectively? How can we get an indication of the
probability of creditdifficulties in the period
ahead? One method is to determine what charac-
teristics of credit relate to collection difficulties,
and then measure the status of those characteris-
tics in the credit structure and the changes in them
over time.2 If, for example, the loan-to-value ratio
on home mortgages is found to be correlated with
subsequent foreclosure experience, then a time
series of the average loan-to-value ratio on all exis-
ting home mortgages should tell us something
about the probable incidence of home mortgage
foreclosures in the period ahead. If debt-payment-
to-income ratios of consumer instalment borrow-
ers have been established as being related to credit
risk, then a change in the average payment-to-
income ratio should tell us that the risk of instal-
ment credit difficulties has changed in the corres-
ponding direction; similarly for other risk-related
loan and borrower characteristics (maturities, fi-
nancial ratios of business firms, etc.).
The relationship between these characteristics
and the risk of collection difficulties is very com-
plex. First, while many tests have been made to
evaluate this relationship (the subject of ChapterCredit Risk: Meaning and Importance 11
5) some of the evidence is partly contradictory,
some of the tests are not as conclusive as we would
wish, and in more than a few cases the relationship
still remains to be tested. Second, in very few tests
have several risk- related characteristics been evalu-
ated simultaneously; thus our knowledge of the
relative importance of the different characteristics
and their interaction is highly limited.
When we are evaluating the probable incidence
of collection difficulties, we need information on
therisk-relatedcharacteristics embodied inall
credit outstanding —informationthat is rarely
available from direct measurement. Part of the
problem is that the composition of the stock of
credit outstanding is constantly changing. New
credit is being granted and old credit is being paid
off. The risk-related characteristics in both the in-
flow and the outflow are not typically the same as
in the continuing outstanding stock. These flows,
consequently, bring about significant changes in
the composition of the characteristics in the stock
of credit outstanding. The changes, in turn, con-
tinually affect the risk of collection difficulties.
The Influence of Business Conditions
The nation's economic health, however, is an
even more important factor thatisconstantly
bringing about changes in the composition of risk-
related characteristics in the stock of credit out-
standing. Some risk-relatedloan and borrower
characteristics (e.g., maturities) will not be affect-
ed by cyclical changes in incomes, unemployment,
prices, etc., but many of the important credit
characteristics are directly influenced, and to a
significant degree, by what happens to business
conditions. When personal incomes and unemploy-
ment change, so do repayments-to-income and
liquid-asset ratios on existing consumer instalment
credit. Variations in the resale value of homes or
cars or farms will alter loan-to-value ratios on out-
standing loans. A climb or fall in profitability will
make a big difference in the liquidity and work-
ing-capital ratios of business borrowers. And these
changes in the composition of risk-related charac-
teristics in the continuing stock of credit outstand-
ing will have an important impact on the incidence
of collection difficulties.
The economic environmentwillinfluence
credit risk in other ways, too. The view borrowers
have of their economic prospects will influence the
amount they desire to borrow and invest. Simi-
larly, as the economy changes, so will lenders vary
their lending standards and, also, their policies on
how quickly and uncompromisingly they start
foreclosure proceedings after the first signs of re-
payment difficulties. But no doubt the most signi-
ficant effect that business conditions exert on the
risk of credit collection difficulties comes about
through the process described above, i.e., through
the changes to the risk-related characteristics in
the outstanding stock of credit.
To sum up, the method used to measure pro-
spective credit risk is to identify the loan and bor-
rower characteristics that are related to risk, then
to measure the composition of those risk-related
characteristics, and changes in those characteris-
tics, in the stock of credit outstanding. Changes in
the characteristics through time can be evaluated
in terms of the three components of the changing
stock of credit: the flow of new credit extended,
the flow of credit paid off and the continuing
stock of credit outstanding. The over-all credit risk
depends on the amount of credit in each com-
ponent and the credit risk (i.e., the characteristics)
of each group. The credit risk of newly extended
credit varies widely through time, but usually it is
higher than average. (Among other reasons, it is
generally at the very beginning of a loan's exis-
tence that the borrower's equity is at a minimum,
i.e., the loan-to-value ratio is highest.) Correspond-
ingly, the credit risk of loans being paid off is
lower than average. Counteracting those factors,
both of which tend to increase over-all credit risk,
is the normal decline in the credit risk of the con-
tinuing stock of credit outstanding as the bor-
rower's equity increases over time. (This is most
obvious in the case of instalment loans, but it ap-
pears to be generally valid for single payment loans
as well.) The credit risk of the continuing stock of
credit is very sensitive to business conditions, be-
cause changes in incomes, unemployment, prices,
etc., bring about significant changes in such risk-
relatedcharacteristicsasrepayments-to-income
ratios, loan-to-value ratios and liquidity ratios.
Symmetry of the Impact of Credit Difficulties
In the discussion above we considered the influ-12 Measures of Credit Risk and Experience
ence of economic conditions on the incidence of
credit difficulties. Now, we will reverse that focus,
turning our attention to the equally important
question of the impact of credit difficulties on the
economy. How may credit difficulties influence
the economic and financial health of the nation?
One of the least understood points about credit
collection difficultiesisthat their impact is in
more than one direction. Unfortunately, econo-
mists nearly always talk about credit quality and
credit risk only in terms of the costs and conse-
quences of its weakness or deterioration. Almost
invariably, the problem is viewed as arising from
the extension of credit on excessively generous
terms and in a volume beyond the productive use
of the borrower, with these actions leading to
serious collection difficulties followed, perhaps, by
widespread losses, a spiraling deflation and general
economic depression.
Itis less often recognized that there is also
danger in the alternative: when credit is extended
on excessively conservative terms and in a quantity
less than that which borrowers can use safely and
productively. The result of such a low level of
credit risk could very well be a level of production,
employment and income significantly below what
otherwise would be achieved. In short, credit risk
is a bilateral problem. Credit can be too safe as
well as too risky, and the consequences of the one
condition can be as serious as the consequences of
the other.3
There is some evidence, for example, that in
the middle 1930's, following the trough of the
Great Depression, creditrisk was unnecessarily
low. Moore, Atkinson and Kilberg derived one in-
dication of this from Hickman's data on corporate
bonds. They addressed themselves to the differ-
ences in risks and credit costs of small versus large
borrowers, and examining the record developed by
Hickman of the promised yields, Loss rates and
realized yields on bonds classified by asset size of
obligor during four-year intervals from 1900 to
1943, they commented:
In short, the aggregate results, from the
point of view of an investor, during these
4-year periods were often more satisfac-
tory but, occasionally, less satisfactory in
the case of bonds of small than of large
corporations. Itis interesting to observe
that the differentials in promised yields
against the smaller corporations became
especially large in 1908-11 and in every
period since 1932, after the heavy losses
on the issues of small firms in the im-
mediately preceding periods (1904-07 and
1928-31). As it turned out, these differ-
entials were by no means required to off-
set differential losses in the subsequent
periods (exceptin1932-35). Hence,
realized yields on outstanding issues of
smallobligorssubstantiallyexceeded
those on the issues of large obligors.4
This strongly suggests that the risk on credit
made available to small businesses in these two
periods was excessively low. The great shocks and
losses of the crisis and depression of 1907-08 and
especially of the Great Depression of 1929-33
were fresh in the memory of both borrowers and
lenders. Lenders were, therefore, reluctant to grant
credit to a sector of the market that had just suf-
fered especially heavy losses, and when bonds were
floated or loans made to smaller borrowers they
carried a substantial interest premium. That these
terms were too conservative, and thus that the
credit riak on loans made to small businesses was
too low, is suggested —thoughnot proved —by
the very high realized yields in the subsequent
periods. It is reasonable to suppose that this may
have deepened the depression and held back the
recovery in business activity.
A second example from the 1930's is seen in
John Lintner's account of the mortgage lendin
policies of mutual savings banks during 193145.
The large losses that the savings banks were taking
on outstanding mortgage loans during the depres-
sion seemed to indicate that this form of invest-
ment involved great risk. As a result, the savings
banks failed to take advantage of the many oppor-
tunities that existed to make loans of acceptable
risk during that period, loans that actually were
being made by other lenders.6
The significance of these examples is that an
increase in credit risk is not invariably adverse and
undesirable. By the same argument, a decline in
credit risk is not necessarily salutary. Historically,
there appears to have been a tendency in America
to believe that credit risk should be held as low asCredit Risk: Meaning and Importance 13
possible, and the lower the better. This idea is
built, no doubt, on the historical prejudice against
the use of debt. Itis reinforced by the highly
visible nature (within an organization, at least) of
credit losses, which provide an easy target for
criticism, and often by their importance to the
profitability, or even the solvency and continued
existence, of the lending institution. Such factors
put a premium on avoiding losses.
The costs of a very low level of credit risk —
reducedoutput and employment, and foregone
profits within the firm —arenot so striking as the
losses, and usually are diffused throughout the
economy rather than bearing directly on the
lender. Thus, the prevailing attitude has more
often been one of caution about possible credit
losses than concern for the performance of the
economy as a whole.
It becomes obvious that the optimum degree of
credit risk is not one of near-perfect safety and no
risk; for that would mean no lending at all. We
have here the age-old economic problem of balanc-
ing risks and returns, of balancing the net costs
and benefits involved in toolittlecredit risk
against the net costs and benefits of too much.
Private vs. Social Impact of Credit Difficulties
These risks and costs that we have been discussing
have two different impacts. The first is what may
be called the private or internal cost of the credit
difficulty. This is the cost that the lender must
absorb when the borrower does not fulfill the
credit contract plus the cost to the borrower. To
the lender, this cost may in extreme cases repre-
sent the entire amount of the loan plus the ex-
pense of the unsuccessful attempt to collect it.
Alternatively, it may be no more than the expense
of keeping track of and bringing up to date a
temporary delinquency.
Lenders can protect themselves against these
private costs through the interest rates they charge
and the reserves they maintain (though of course
they may not always do so). In the case of some
trade credit, the seller can insure his accounts re-
ceivable against bad debt losses. Lenders who give
credit on more generous terms to riskier bor-
rowers, and who thus experience greater losses,
typically charge higher interest rates. Moreover, as
credit risk changes through time lenders can, in
some cases at least, maintain their coverage of the
private risk by changing the interest rates that they
charge.
The second cost is the social or external cost.
In its simplest form, this cost is the loss to the
economy of the business activity formerly carried
on by the defaulting firm, including the secondary
effects (on other lines of business) of the reduced
economicactivity.Resources —workersand
capital facilities —thatformerly were employed
are now idle, and they may not be absorbed im-
mediately into other activities.
The social cost of excessive credit risk takes
other forms as well. Perhaps the firm that failed
was, at an earlier point in time, a marginal but
operating business; then an unwise loan to the firm
provided it with the means to expand, although it
did not have the capability to do so efficiently.
During the attempt to expand, it outbid other
firms, most of which were efficient, for economic
resources. This diversion of resources from effi-
cient to inefficient operations is a second form of
the external cost. The attempted expansion also
might have helped generate inflationary pressures,
which would be a third form of the external cost.
The failure of the firm, when it comes, is not a
cost in and of itself; the failure is, rather, the un-
doing of earlier mistakes —theunwise extension
of credit and the misallocation of resources. But
failure brings with it the important costs of idled
resources and secondary effects on other lines of
business.
Still another social cost of excessive credit risk
occurs when a series of defaults or failures in a
particular area or industry brings about a decline
in the willingness of lenders and borrowers to in-
vest there. Even delinquencies, the least costly sort
of credit difficulty, if they begin to appear in sub-
stantial numbers, might easily dampen the readi-
ness of borrowers to take on new or additional
investment commitments and the willingness of
lenders to make them.7 Beyond this, in a severe
situation lenders may be pressed for liquidity and
be forced to call in other loans, some of which
then become uncollectableeven though their
terms would have been met under normal circum-
stances.
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private and social risks and costs is to be seen in
the fact that, although the private costs are nor-
mally offset by the interest rate, the social costs
are not. Outside of general stabilization policies,
there is no protection against the external costs
that affect the economy at large.
Lenders may also be protected from the private
costs of credit difficulties through government
guarantees or insurance. VA-guaranteed and FHA-
insured home mortgages are the most prominent
illustrations.Here again protection against the
social costs is absent. Several years ago in Florida,
for example, a large volume of FHA-backed mort-
gage money provided builders with the means to
finance a large expansion in the construction of
new residences. The demand for housing in the
area, however, did not expand with the supply,
and the result was a sharp rise in foreclosures. The
lending institutions were not hurt in any serious
way —theirprivate costs, except for minor fore-
closure expenses, were covered by the FHA in-
surance; they simply turned the foreclosed real
estate over to the government. The economy of
the area, however, suffered badly. The oversupply
of houses existed for several years and brought
about a local depression in the construction in-
dustry, until the excess inventory of housing units
was absorbed. Further, the owners of other prop-
erty in the area who sold their homes during this
period had to do so in a depressed market. The
social costs of the situation were severe, even
though the private costs were minimal.8
Role of Credit Risk in Economic Fluctuations
Economic fluctuations, as mentioned earlier, have
a pronounced influence on credit performance. At
the same time, changes in credit risk and credit
performance exert an influence on cyclical fluctua-
tions in business, a subject that requires at least
brief mention.
Business cycles are complex phenomena. Al-
though our concern is with the effects of changes
in credit risk and credit difficulties on business
conditions (and vice versa), it should be under-
stood throughout that this is only one among the
many forces that help to shape the business cycle.
No undue emphasis on the role of credit risk is
intended. Furthermore, the purpose of this dis-
•cussion is merely to show some of the major
channels through which credit performance thay
influence economic fluctuations, in order to indi-
cate why we believe the data gathered together in
this volume are important.
Changes in credit risk and credit difficulties can
play a part in economic fluctuations by (1) helping
to initiate a change in the direction of business, or
(2) adding to the severity of a cyclical movement
once under way. The evidence and opinion are less
clear on the first point than on the second. Writing
on the role of credit quality in the Great Depres-
sion, Geoffrey Moore stated:
Inthepast few years important new
historical evidence has been developed on
the cumulating deteriorationinthe
quality of credit during the period of
prosperitythat precedes severe depres-
sion. This deterioration took place in the
twenties and was largely unrecognized at
the time —butthis only added to its de-
pressing force when the test came. This is
not to say that the deterioration in credit
was the sole or even the main cause of the
Great Depression. All that the evidence
shows conclusively, in my opinion, is that
it helped to make the depression much
deeper and longer than it might otherwise
have been.9
Helping Cause the Turns
One way in which changes in credit risk might
help bring about a cyclical turn in business is sug-
gested inthe Moore-Klein study of consumer
credit quality.10 They show, first, that cyclical
swings in consumer credit delinquencies and losses
conform inverselyto business activity,falling
during prosperity and rising in contractions. This
inverse conformity between repayment difficulties
and the business cycle indicates that the influence
of swings in business activity on the risk-related
loan and borrower characteristics of the continu-
ing stock of consumer credit outstanding, and
thereby on credit difficulties, tends to dominate
the time pattern of consumer credit experience.
The movements in credit difficulties, however,
lead the turning points in general business condi-
tions; the cyclical turns in delinquencies occur
some months in advance of cyclical turns in busi-Credit Risk: Meaning and Importance 15
ness.11 As Moore and Klein point out, these leads
are consistent with the hypothesis that cyclical
changes in the credit risk on new instalment loans
also have an influence on collection difficulties,
but one operating in the opposite direction to that
of income and employment.
The situation is one of opposing and offsetting
forces. The first component is the continuing
stock of consumer credit outstanding, the credit
risk of which is reduced significantly over the
course of the business expansion as incomes rise,
unemployment falls, prices rise, etc. The second
component is the flow of credit paid off, with
lower-than-averagecreditrisk, which probably
doesn't change much over the business cycle. The
third component is the flow of new credit. The
credit risk on new credit is usually higher than
average, and during a business expansion the
availability of credit on easier terms and to less
creditworthy borrowers tends to raise that risk
substantially. The net balance of these three
forces, as indicated by the record of consumer in-
stalment delinquencies, shows that the cyclical
changes in the credit risk of the continuing stock
of credit dominate the over-all credit risk most of
the time, but that during the last stages of business
expansion apparently the high and rising risk on
newly extended credit becomes the dominant
force. This pattern becomes especially likely if the
improvement in incomes is slower and the easing
of credit standards becomes more pronounced in
the late stages of the business upswing.
Thus, delinquencies on consumer instalment
credit typically begin to increase before a business
contraction gets underway. Additionally, liabilities
of business failures (and failures of large busi-
nesses) have a long history of leading downturns in
the economy.12 Perhaps these turns for the worse
in credit performance contribute in some degree,
through a tightening of lenders' credit policies, to
the onset of a business decline.It should be
emphasized that this hypothesis is highly tentative
and not tested, but it does illustrate a possible
route by which changes in credit risk may help set
in motion a change in economic conditions.
There isalso a possibility that a large and
highly publicized business or bank failure might
serve to initiate a downturn in business. An eco-
nomy narrowly balanced between expansion and
contraction quite possibly could be put onto the
downward track by the psychological impact of a
spectacular bankruptcy. Mitchellstates,for
example, that "It was a series of bank failures in
New York that turned the crisis of 1907 into a
panic."13
Aggravating the Cycle
As mentioned, more credence is generally given
to the hypothesis that shifts in credit risk and
credit difficulties play a role in accentuating and
aggravating business cycle expansions and con-
tractions. Credit isa mechanism that makes it
possible for economic units to spend out of phase
with their income. It enables producers and con-
sumers to bunch or postpone their major pur-
chases of capital goods. Cyclical changes in lending
standards (and thus in credit risk), to the extent
that they arein accord with changes in the
quantity of credit, not only allow but encourage
such bunching to an even greater degree than if
lending standards remained constant. In business
expansions this can intensifythe demand for
major durable goods, and in economic contrac-
tions, dampen such demands. It is in this manner
thatcyclicalswingsin lending standards can
exaggerate cyclical swings in business activity.
Another way to consider the same point is in
terms of the timing of the saving that takes place
with a credit purchase of a capital good, particu-
larly where repayments are scheduled in regular
instalments. A cash sale means that the buyer's
financial saving for the capital equipment takes
place before purchase; a credit sale means that the
saving takes place subsequently, i.e., as the loan is
paid off.14 When shifts in lending standards tend
further to concentrate credit sales in a period of
business expansion, spending is increased more
than saving, thus adding fuel to the business up-
swing. Conversely, inthe business contraction
when purchases are postponed, saving takes place
in the form of repayments on the debt contracted
earlier and spending is reduced further. The key
point is the flexibility in the timing of the pur-
chases, which thus are bunched in prosperous
periods, coupled with the inflexibility of the re-
payments, which can be a drain on current in-
comes during a period when more spending, and
not more saving, may be needed. In this way,16 Measures of Credit Risk and Experience
changes in lending standards can make a destabiliz-
ing contribution to the momentum of both phases
of the business cycle.
TheFederalReserve, discussing consumer
credit and economic stability, reported evidence
that instalment credit sales fluctuate over a wider
range than cash sales. Furthermore, this fact may
be explained in part by changes in credit terms
and, probably, in the standards applied to bor-
rower creditworthiness, too. "Excluding occasions
when terms were shortened by regulation, the
record suggests that the easing of terms was a sub-
stantially stimulative force on several occasions
and that tightening was a mildly depressing force
on at least one occasion."15
Another and possibly more important way that
changes in credit risk can be cycle-aggravating is
through the effect of repayment difficulties on in-
vestor confidence, the influence of delinquencies,
foreclosures, failures and losses on the optimism
and pessimism of business and financial decision-
makers. Reference was made to this point earlier
in the chapter, in the discussion of the social costs
of credit difficulties.
When business is expanding, confidence grows
apace among investors and lenders; both take risks
they would have rejected earlier. Speculators find
they can finance their ventures on the proverbial
shoestring. All of this involves looser credit terms
and a friendlier welcome to borrowers with charac-
teristics that involve a high degree of credit risk.
Correspondingly, when the economy is in a de-
clining phase, it is not only the dim prospects for
sales and profitsthat keep businessmen from
making new investment commitments, but also the
fear of losses and the possibility of failure. Lenders
are of course affected in the same way; they
develop, in the phrase Robert Gordon used, a
"once burned, twice shy" attitude.16
The chain reaction that credit difficulties may
set in motion can stem not only from their impact
on investor and lenderconfidence, butalso
through the institutional arrangements by which
financial organizations are regulated. Bank regula-
tory agencies, for example, have various formulae
to estimate the liquidity requirements and the
capital adequacy of banks. Among the criteria is
the risk status of the bank's loans. All loans about
which there is no question require capital backing
of, say, 12 per cent. If the bank examiners classify
a loan as "substandard," however, the amount of
required capital behind it might rise to 20 per
cent; if "doubtful," 50 per cent; and if it is a "loss
loan," 100 per cent. Thus, if serious loan weak-
nesses show up ina bank's examination, the
amount of capital required will increase substan-
tially. If the bank has a strong capital position and
its bad-debt reserves are sufficient, the situation
can be taken in stride. But if the capital position is
thin and the bad-debt reserves inadequate, the
emergence of a significant amount of classified
loans would likely cause the bank to severely re-
strictits lending. And should this occur in a
number of banks at the same time that business
conditions were weakening, the tighter lending
policies would work to exacerbate the cyclical
contraction. And, of course, the reverse process
would add extra fuel to a business upswing.17
Related Topics
Our discussion in this section has been carried
forth in terms of the impact of credit difficulties
on cyclical fluctuations in business activity. Two
further aspects of this topic, which we do not take
up here, surely deserve attention. They are the role
of credit risk and credit difficulties in the business
cycleas opposed to long swings in economic
growth ("Kuznets cycles"), and their relative in-
fluence on mild or moderate business cycles as
opposed to severe cycles. On the latter point,
Burns and Mitchell tentatively suggested an in-
triguing hypothesis:
After aseveredepression industrial
activity rebounds sharply, but speculation
does not. The following contraction in
business is mild, which leads people to be
less cautious. Consequently, in the next
two or three cycles, while the cyclical ad-
vances become progressively smaller in in-
dustrialactivity, they become progres-
sivelylargerinspeculativeactivity.
Finally, the speculative boom collapses
and a drastic liquidation follows, which
ends this cycle of cycles and brings us
back to the starting point.'8
Credit Risk and Credit Quantity
Because the quantity of money and credit isCredit Risk: Meaning and Importance 17
often given considerable emphasis in the cyclical
processes of the economy, it is worthwhile to con-
sider the interrelationship between credit quantity
and credit risk. The two typically move in con-
formity. It is, in fact, difficult to conceive of a
cyclical expansion or contraction in the volume of
credit (measured relative to the size of the eco-
nomy) without a corresponding movement in at
least some of the factors used to measure risk.
Changes in credit terms or in the quality composi-
tion of borrowers are often the means by which a
change in the quantity of credit is brought about.
Higher loan-to-value ratios, longer maturities, a
larger proportion of families or business firms
using credit —allnormally involve an increased
volume of credit outstanding relative to the size of
the economy. Indeed, ratios of the volume of debt
to income and debt to assets are used regularly as
indicators of credit risk.19
In one sense, then, many of our measures of
risk pertain directly to the relation between the
volume of debt and the capacity to repay it. It is
thus possible to think of the effect that credit risk
has on cyclical fluctuations in the economy as an
integral part of the mechanism by which changes
in the quantity of credit influence the business
cycle.
Yet measures of credit risk have a distinct func-
tion, too. For whether or not the volume of credit
changes, the risk position of the credit structure
can vary, and these independent movements in the
risk position of the nation's credit instruments can
have important consequences of their own. Thus,
even if the total volume of credit outstanding were
to remain unchanged, its risk could change, and
with a significant impact on the performance of
the economy.
1There are many different forms of credit difficulties:
delinquencies, failures, losses, etc. Throughout most of
this book, we use "credit difficulties" as a generic term
encompassing all forms. The first part of Chapter 3, how-
ever, discusses the differences among the several types of
credit difficulties.
2Other methods of measuring prospective credit risk
include credit ratings and market yield differentials. These
are discussed in later chapters; they are not included in
this discussion because they are based importantly on the
risk-related characteristics.
3Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, mA
Monetary Historyof theUnitedStates, 18 75-1960
(Princeton for NBER, 1963), addressed themselves to this
point as follows:
Itisawidespread economic fallacyto
believe that higher average quality is necessarily
better both for society and for the individual
lender han lower average quality is. This is no
more true of credit than of other services or of
commodities. The opposite view that what we
always need is more venturesomeness or more
risk capital is not true either, though there are
many who simultaneously hold both views
without recognizing that they are mutually con-
tradictory. Quality must be balanced against
quantity or, what is equivalent, against cost.
For credit, uniformly high quality can be ob-
tained only by limiting the capital market to an
extremely small role in the economy, which
would probably greatly reduce the economy's
productivity and efficiency.
4Moore, Atkinson and Kilberg, Report to the Com-
mittees on Banking and Currency. ..,p.79.
5john Lintner, Mutual Savings Banks in the Savings
and Mortgage Markets, Cambridge, Mass.,1948, pp.
222-238, especially pp. 236-238.
6lhis is not intended as an indictment of the lenders
of these periods for excessive conservatism in their lend-
ing policies. It is hindsight that leads us to ask whether
the credit risk of those periods was not lower than later
proved to be necessary. Our purpose is to illustrate the
possibility that credit risk may be held too low.
7The impact of credit difficulties on the economy can
come at an even earlier stage. The borrower, although he
is able to repay his debt on scnedule, may be forced to
conduct his personal affairs or operate his business differ-
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